High-Power Microwave (HPM) Weapons' Effects and Failure Analysis Tool
Navy SBIR FY2012.1


Sol No.: Navy SBIR FY2012.1
Topic No.: N121-008
Topic Title: High-Power Microwave (HPM) Weapons' Effects and Failure Analysis Tool
Proposal No.: N121-008-0402
Firm: TechFlow, Inc.
2155 Louisiana Blvd., NE
Suite 3200
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87110
Contact: J DelGrande
Phone: (505) 903-6844
Web Site: www.techflow.com
Abstract: TechFlow Scientific, a division of TechFlow Inc., will leverage over a century of High Power Microwave (HPM) Effects Test and Modeling experience to develop an integrated toolkit that models the vulnerability and susceptibility of electronic systems, subsystems and components to directed energy (DE) HPM weapons. The analysis toolkit developed will center on three essential modules, critical in a full assessment of any test & evaluation application. They include: propagation of the HPM weapon energy to the target, interaction of that energy with the target to include inter-cavity coupling, and finally the effect that induced currents and voltages have on the system, subsystem, or component. The tool will provide for the intrinsically stochastic nature of HPM effects, while offering users an intuitive and simple interface with which to assess the vulnerability of US systems to HPM attack, or, conversely, HPM weapons system effectiveness.
Benefits: This research effort will result in an HPM-vulnerability assessment and mitigation methodology that will be readily applicable to systems beyond the Navy systems studied. The effort will also result in the identification of specific, user developed, hardening techniques that will be suitable for other classes of electronic targets. In Phase-III of this research effort, TechFlow will work closely with national HPM test sites to develop and implement a plan to transition our HPM vulnerability assessment and mitigation methodology and successful hardening approaches. Transition customers will include not only China Lake, but test sites such as Eglin AFB and AFRL which routinely test such systems, and most notably the developers of U.S. weapons systems required to meet MIL-STD-464C requirements. The need is evidenced by the recent request of the DEPS DE Effects Committee for a similar methodology, and the FY13 Test Resource Management Center S&T DE Test Broad Agency Announcement, looking for "Predictive Tools to Assist Testers Scope HPM Effects Parameter Space." Several existing DoD-funded programs can benefit from our proposed methodology. For instance, the tools developed here could be used to assess the effectiveness of the various alternatives to the follow-on program of record for the CHAMP Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) platform, where parametric effects tests may not have been conducted for the given HPM pulse parameters. Similarly, bench level testing could replace full system level testing to provide HPM LAVA data what would in turn support weapon system effectiveness for the Navy's Boat Stopper program. When coupled with HPM engagement models such as JREM, the HPM LAVA toolkit will be able to assess exposure levels that might constitute HPM-fratricide. The tools ability to provide hardening techniques would be suitable not only to improve shielding from HPM attack, but from all generalized EM sources, both friend and foe. In terms of commercialization, such techniques may be the most promising as they reach a larger market. EM hardening activities are vigorous in both the government and commercial sector. The Pentagon, which contains several rooms housing sensitive command and control systems, requires adequate electromagnetic shielding from possible intentional/unintentional EM-attacks. A variant of this problem is also faced by commercial companies and financial institutions that want to protect their sensitive proprietary information, computer systems or server farms (which are typically housed within secure rooms) from wireless sniffing attacks by malicious computer hackers for personal profit or industrial espionage.

Return